鈥淐orporate Hedging, Contract Rights, and Basis Risk鈥
With the Lunch Seminar series, the Department of Finance is bringing eminent and up-and-coming researchers from around the world to Luxembourg.
Abstract
A hedging contract can be terminated by a counterparty following a firm’s event of default, such as a credit downgrade, covenant violation, or bankruptcy. This right is often exercised. Our model shows that although the termination right reduces hedging costs, it can reduce firm value because the counterparty exercising it does not consider the externality imposed on the firm. Consequently, firms hedge less, especially when facing high bankruptcy costs, and are more likely to enter liquidation. Using detailed hedging data, we confirm the model’s predictions and provide an explanation for low hedging during financial distress.
About the speaker
is an Associate Professor at Arizona State 8xav福利导航. He is a聽financial economist聽at Arizona State 8xav福利导航. Yuri’s research interests are in dynamic models of firm behaviour, real options, asset pricing implications of investment options, capital structure, debt structure, employee compensation.聽He also taught and conducted research at聽Hong Kong 8xav福利导航 of Science and Technology, Bocconi 8xav福利导航 in Milan,聽 New Economic School in Moscow, and聽WU university in Vienna. Beginning 2014 he is a member of the Advisory Board of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. Yuri Tserlukevich obtained his Ph.D. from 8xav福利导航 of California at Berkeley.
Language
English.
This is a free event. Registration is mandatory.
Cold lunches are provided to registered participants only.